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Writing Lines: Agamben contra Nietzsche 
 
Répétitions is the name that Paul Eluard gives to one of his collections of poetry, for 
whose frontispiece Max Ernst has drawn four small boys. They turn their backs to 
the reader, to their teacher and his desk as well, and look out over a balustrade where 
a balloon hangs in the air. A giant pencil rests on the windowsill. The repetition of 
childhood experience gives us pause: when we were little, there was as yet no 
agonized protest against the world of our parents. As children in the midst of the 
world, we showed ourselves superior. When we reach for the banal, we take hold of 
the good along with it—the good that is there (open your eyes) right before you. 
–Walter Benjamin, Dream Kitsch (1927) 
 
In his 1988 foreword to Infancy and History: The Destruction of Experience, Giorgio 
Agamben declares, “In both my written and unwritten books, I have stubbornly pursued only one 
train of thought: what is the meaning of ‘there is language’; what is the meaning of ‘I speak’?” 
(Agamben 2007, 6). There is no cause to doubt the philosopher’s word, when from infancy to 
testimony, his work across the decades indicates a clear engagement with the enunciative. But, 
what of that other facet of language, the inscriptive—that is, what of writing? In a radio 
interview that the philosopher gave in 2004, he commented that “wanting to write is the desire to 
experience potentiality” (Durantaye, 2-3). 
Agamben’s disposition toward writing, however, is more ambiguous than this sentiment 
may suggest, as is indicated by his sometimes emphatic and sometimes ambiguous stance on 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence of the same, to which he has sometimes referred in 
relation to the inscriptive. For instance, in a passing remark at the end of another interview that 
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he gave to the Süddeutsche Zeitung in that same year, Agamben commented that he stands “with 
Benjamin, who said, the eternal return is like the punishment of detention, the sentence in school 
in which one had to copy the same sentence a thousand times” (Raulff, 614). Compare this 
assessment of the eternal return to that in his 1982 essay titled “Benjamin and the Demonic: 
Happiness and Historical Redemption.” Therein, by contrast, Agamben qualifies Benjamin’s 
reading of the eternal return that “perhaps unjustly” sees in it “the punishment given to 
schoolchildren that consists in having to copy out the same text countless times,” by noting the 
German-Jewish thinker’s recognition of its revolutionary possibility for “[exasperating] mythic 
repetition to the point of finally bringing it to a halt” (Agamben 1999b, 155). 
Nevertheless, Agamben elsewhere addresses the eternal return with no apparent reference 
to writing, as in its mention in “Marginal Notes on Commentaries on the Society of the 
Spectacle” (1990) in which he cites it as an example of “the messianic shift that integrally 
changes the world, leaving it, at the same time, almost intact . . . ” (Agamben 2000, 79), while in 
Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive (1998), it shares its temporal status with 
the camp (Agamben 1999c, 99-103). These are but a few of the varied references to the eternal 
return in his corpus that range from affirmative to condemnatory. 
What precisely is at stake here? Is Agamben’s fluctuating position on the eternal return 
simply a matter of “a move away from the line drawn by one treasured thinker in the direction of 
a line drawn by another,” in the difficult endeavor of “developing a philosophy of potentiality 
able to come to terms with the past,” as one critic has argued (Durantaye, 323)?i Is the Strafe des 
Nachsitzens, the punishment of writing lines that Benjamin refers to, thus merely an expedient 
analogy rather than an indicator of the particularity of writing to Agamben’s determination of 
Nietzsche’s concept? Even if one were to accept the hypothesis that in Remnants of Auschwitz 
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Agamben rereads the eternal return as incompatible with his concern for the past, is the account 
of his profound change in position as simply coterminous with the influence of other thinkers 
adequate to the task of drawing out this thought from obscurity? To the contrary, beyond the 
register of potentiality, Agamben’s shift in position on Nietzsche’s eternal return, when read in 
its own specificity, betrays an affinity between writing and instrumentality in which temporality 
plays a crucial role. 
The philosopher’s engagement with the eternal return begins with a somewhat distant set 
of concerns, however, bearing the inflection of his teacher Martin Heidegger. In his 1970 treatise 
on art and the history of aesthetics, The Man Without Content, Agamben’s affirmative reading of 
the eternal return strongly echoes Heidegger’s four-volume Nietzsche (1961), with its emphasis 
on both inversion and the decisive character of surpassing nihilism.ii In this early encounter with 
Nietzsche, Agamben reads in the eternal return the ultimate inversion of nihilism that man 
achieves in art, his “highest task and truly metaphysical activity.” He writes, “In the idea of the 
eternal recurrence, nihilism attains its most extreme form, but for precisely this reason it enters a 
zone in which surpassing it becomes possible” (Agamben 1999a, 87-8). 
In Man Without Content, Agamben distinguishes between the passive Romantic nihilism 
that impoverishes life and the vital enrichment of an active Dionysian nihilism to propose the 
thought of an art that, detached from all historical conceptions of aesthetics founded upon ideas 
of spectatorship and creative genius, joins the will to power and the eternal return in a circle in 
which the three reciprocally “belong to one another” (89-90). Determining the will to power as 
the most intimate essence of being as life and becoming, and the eternal return as “the most 
extreme possible approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being,” Agamben argues 
that it is in art, as the fundamental trait of the will to power, that “the essence of man and the 
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essence of the universal becoming are identical to one another” (92; translation modified). Citing 
Nietzsche’s aphorism “The Heaviest Weight” of The Gay Science (1882) in which the demon 
condemns one to relive every moment of his life identically over and over for eternity (Nietzsche 
273-4), through his participation in art, man’s will to power grasps and inhabits this curse, 
inverting the nihilism of the eternal recurrence of the same into the amor fati that loves and 
desires just this. With a messianic inflection, Agamben avers, “Nihilism is surpassed in the man 
who recognizes his essence starting from this will and this love, and who tunes his being to the 
universal becoming in the circle of the eternal recurrence. At the same time, chaos and nature are 
the object of a redemption that transforms every ‘it was’ into ‘thus I wanted it to be’” (Agamben 
1999a, 91). 
A number of years later in 1986, Agamben again addressed the subject of the eternal return 
and its affiliation to the will to power in a paper titled “The Eternal Return and the Paradox of 
Passion.” This essay, though still bearing traces of the influence of Heidegger, touches upon a 
number of concepts found elsewhere in Agamben’s oeuvre, and already evidences a more 
nuanced perspective on Nietzsche’s proposition. Determining the same (gleiche) of the eternal 
return of the same (ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen), as likeness or image via an elaborate 
etymological lineage inclusive of the term corpse, he writes,  
The paradox that Nietzsche invites us to consider is that of an Abbild, an image 
which precedes both what it is an image of, and what it is impressed upon: a like, a 
likeness which anticipates both terms being compared, being likened. Not only, 
therefore, does the thought of eternal return contain a like, an image, but this like, 
this image, is the Original, preceding both being and becoming, both the subject and 
the object. But how can an image precede that of which it is an image? How can we 
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conceive of a likeness, an omoisis, which precedes that to which it bears 
resemblance? How can the impression be more primordial than the subject which 
bears it? . . . . The image in question is not an image of nothing. It is perfectly self-
referential. The [will to power] is a [will to likeness] to a pure likening involving 
neither subject nor object—an image of itself, the impression of itself on itself, pure 
self-affection (Agamben 1988, 14).  
While Agamben’s formula to some extent recalls Heidegger’s imagining of the will to power as 
a will to semblance (Heidegger, 218),iii the agency associated with art in Man Without Content as 
the “truly metaphysical activity of man” is absent from this construction as the like—the 
image—becomes the autonomous Original that precedes that of which it is an image. As pure 
likening, it assumes the mediatory status of his later formulation of pure means as 
communicability (Agamben 2000, 56-60), but here as an originary capacity for transmission that 
comes before all else, any act or representation. 
The self-referential image of the will to likeness [Wille zur Gleichheit], as an originary 
impressibility, is not an emptiness but a potency that is both active and passive, in his words, 
both a passive receptivity and a tension towards action and spontaneity (Agamben 1988, 15) that 
extends beyond the imagistic to the implicate the inscriptive as well. Reflecting upon its kinship 
with a late fragment of Kant’s on the thing-in-itself and Aristotle’s On the Soul, he likens this 
potency that unites in itself passivity and spontaneity, potentia and act, to a wax surface upon 
which nothing is written, an “inextinguishable potency” (Agamben 1988, 16).  
While Agamben will later embrace the uninscribed writing tablet in the name of 
potentiality, here, evoking Klossowski, he understands the “vicious circle” of Nietzsche’s will to 
likeness as a mere reiteration of the paradox of the fundamental precept of Western philosophy, 
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“the bottomless foundation of pure subjectivity in pure self-affection” (15).iv However, unlike 
Bataille and Levinas, whom he claims that along with Derrida and Heidegger have all pushed 
just such a passivity to its extreme pole in the attempt to extricate potentia passiva from the knot 
that binds it to potentia activa, Agamben asserts that Nietzsche’s effort to surpass the wax tablet 
with the eternal return in fact comprises the conception of a “final identity” of the two powers, 
active and passive, coinciding in the will to power as a pure passion affecting itself (17). 
In words foreshadowing those employed in Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the 
Archive (1998) to a very different end, Agamben writes, 
Pure passion, as the final coincidence of potentia passiva and potentia activa, is in 
itself immemorable. The like, the image perpetually returning, cannot be retained in 
the memory. Its eternal return is its passion, in which, between the writing and its 
erasing, there is, as Nietzsche says, keine Zeit, no time. . . . As an image of nothing, 
the like disappears in its own enduring, and is destroyed through its own salvation 
(17). 
Contrary to his later insistence in Remnants of Auschwitz upon the impossible coincidence of 
these two facets of subjectivity (Agamben 1999c, 109-12), the overriding sense here in which 
between writing and its erasing there is no time, there seems to be not some eternally primordial 
before nor a fleeting time that cannot be grasped, but rather a compression of time—a complete 
and total coincidence that disintegrates into timelessness, as active and passive are fused into a 
single originary power.v The eternal return thus does not linger in a before writing, “a 
‘passionate’ dimension which precedes all possibility and in which nothing has yet been given to 
Dasein” (Agamben 1988, 17). Rather, in the eternal return the active and passive principles are 
conjoined with no remainder, no time. “The Eternal Return and the Paradox of Passion” thus 
© Jenny Doussan 2015 
 
7 
stakes a claim for Nietzsche’s proposition that Agamben will retain in Remnants of Auschwitz, 
but unequivocally distance himself from. 
Between these two early mentions of the eternal return, one can determine a clear line of 
influence leading to its appearance in Agamben’s essays on gesture of the early 1990s that 
feature in the Means Without End volume, though the emphases of the latter tend toward the 
imagistic and the enunciative, rather than the inscriptive. With its insistence upon the fusion of 
potential and act that produces a liberating force from a vacuous present, the earlier of the two, 
“Marginal Notes on Commentaries on the Society of the Spectacle” (1990), bears a somewhat 
more direct if esoteric relationship to Man Without Content and the “Paradox of Passion” essay 
than “Notes on Gesture” (1992). 
Commenting upon the transformative force of Debord’s situation, Agamben asserts, 
The situation is neither the becoming-art of life nor the becoming-life of art. We can 
comprehend its true nature only if we locate it historically in its proper place: that is, 
after the end and self-destruction of art, and after the passage of life through the trial 
of nihilism. The “Northwest passage of the geography of the true life” is a point of 
indifference between life and art, where both undergo a decisive metamorphosis 
simultaneously. This point of indifference constitutes a politics that is finally 
adequate to its tasks. The Situationists counteract capitalism—which “concretely and 
“deliberately” organizes environments and events in order to depotentiate life—with 
a concrete, although opposite, project. Their utopia is, once again, perfectly topical 
because it locates itself in the taking-place of what it wants to overthrow (Agamben 
2000, 78-9). 
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Thus, at the fated historical moment after the end of art, an inhabitation of the medial taking-
place may invert the depotentiated life produced by capitalism into a liberated concrete 
presence.vi Referring once more to The Gay Science, Agamben cites the eternal return as the 
exemplary situation: 
A constructed situation is the room with the spider and the moonlight between the 
branches exactly in the moment when—in an answer to the demon’s question: “Do 
you desire this once more and innumerable times more?”—it is said: “Yes, I do.” 
What is decisive here is the messianic shift that integrally changes the world, leaving 
it, at the same time, almost intact: everything here, in fact, stayed the same, but lost 
its identity (79). 
Recalling the “Paradox of Passion” essay’s eternal return of the like that is “destroyed through its 
own salvation,” the messianic shift of the eternal return here evacuates identity, but does so by 
exploiting the mediatory “point of indifference” of gesture. Despite its language of the 
messianic, Agamben’s sentiment echoes not just Klossowski, but also Deleuze who himself 
draws much from the latter. The critique of representation implicit here recalls that of Difference 
and Repetition (1968), in which repetition in the eternal return “carries every object to that 
extreme ‘form’ in which its representation comes undone,” the affirmation of a world that is both 
completed and without limit (Deleuze 2011, 69).vii 
This messianic potency of the eternal return recurs in “Notes on Gesture” (1992), though it 
is somewhat compromised by its location within a more intricate framework of time and history. 
Assigning Nietzsche’s historical site at the culmination of European culture’s crisis of gesture 
that would see it either lost or transfigured into fate, Agamben avers, “The thought of the eternal 
return, in fact, is intelligible only as a gesture in which potential and act, naturalness and manner, 
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contingency and necessity, become indiscernible (ultimately, in other words, only as theatre)” 
(Agamben 2000, 53; translation modified). Amor fati thus represents here the last gasp of the 
wish of a humankind already bereft of gestures to cleave to them. 
In a marked departure from the “Paradox of Passion” essay, the eternal return of the same 
as image gives way to the eternal return as gesture, and Agamben here sets the two in opposition. 
Taking a cue from Deleuze’s work on cinema, the gesture as the “exhibition of a mediality” 
figures the messianic inversion that shatters the mythical rigidity of the image. The dichotomy 
between the image and gesture repeats the terms of the “Paradox of Passion” essay, but to 
different effect. While in the first instance, the imago founds the like of the eternal return, here it 
represents its opposite as the effacement of the gesture: 
Every image, in fact, is animated by an antinomic polarity: on the one hand, images 
are the reification and obliteration of a gesture (it is the imago as death mask or as 
symbol); on the other hand, they preserve the dynamis in tact (as in Muybridge’s 
snapshots or in any sports photograph). The former corresponds to the recollection 
seized by voluntary memory, while the latter corresponds to the image flashing up in 
the epiphany of involuntary memory. And while the former lives in magical 
isolation, the latter always refers beyond itself to a whole of which it is a part (55). 
Despite the Deleuzian character to these readings of the eternal return, consistent with his 
thought in the early to mid-1990s, this turn of phrase with which Agamben establishes a 
correspondence between will and temporality, is suggestive of sentiments expressed elsewhere 
on the Platonic Idea. The potency of the gesture emerges unexpectedly and fleetingly, while the 
reification of gesture in the image conveys a stagnation in an impossible willed time. In “Notes 
on Gesture,” Agamben expands upon the relationship of the gesture with the Idea: 
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A paralyzing power whose spell we need to break, is continuously at work in every 
image; it is as if a silent invocation calling for the liberation of the image into gesture 
arose from the entire history of art. This is what in ancient Greece was expressed by 
the legends in which statues break the ties holding them and begin to move. But this 
is also the intention that philosophy entrusts to the idea, which is not at all an 
immovable archetype as common interpretations would have it, but rather a 
constellation in which phenomena arrange themselves in a gesture (56). 
This opposition between image and gesture further disrupts Agamben’s conception of the eternal 
return itself as presented in the “Paradox of Passion” essay by shifting its characterization as the 
potent emptiness of an image that always precedes itself to the fullness invited by gesture that 
always refers beyond itself to the whole of which it is a part. 
While the suggestion of the Platonic Idea may seem quite distant from Nietzsche and the 
eternal return, the opposition that Agamben stages here between the gesture and the static image 
recalls an earlier argument that discloses an antipathy for writing embedded within the 
philosopher’s opposition between the Platonic and Aristotelian theories of language. Whereas in 
the concluding sentiment of “Notes on Gesture,” the appearance of the Idea in the gesture is 
stated as the exposure of a word in “its own mediality,” a “communication of a 
communicability” (59), in the 1984 essay that he dedicated to Jacques Derrida, “The Thing 
Itself,” Agamben asserts that the task of philosophical presentation is the “coming of speech to 
speech” (Agamben 1999b, 33-4). This task is accomplished by casting off the Aristotelian protē 
ousia that is characterized by a negative temporality and impossible presence residing in the 
gramma, and restoring to language its sayability, the Platonic thing itself in the Idea 
characterized by the absolute present of pure communicability. 
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In order to place Agamben’s position on the eternal return within the parallel development 
of language in his thought, it is a worthy digression to consider this essay, included in the 
Potentialities compilation, and briefly rehearse its opposition between the thing itself of the 
Platonic Idea with the Aristotelian protē ousia. In “The Thing Itself,” Agamben finds in Plato’s 
discussion of the five aspects of the Idea [Letter VII 342a-343a] (Plato, 1589-90) a theory of 
linguistic signification that acknowledges the sayability that is unsaid and forgotten in the saying. 
This is the fifth aspect that illuminates the other four, the thing itself that founds the weakness of 
language, the restitution of which is Agamben’s imperative (Agamben 1999b, 33-5). 
Where Aristotle diverges from this Platonic construction is with his three-fold theory of 
signification delineated in the opening lines of On Interpretation [16a2-8] (Aristotle Vol. 1, 25) 
that in effect eliminates the fourth and the fifth aspects: knowledge and the thing itself. In this 
Aristotelian model, which, according to Agamben, is shared by the modern distinction between 
sense and denotation, the sayability of the thing itself is subsumed as the presupposition that 
makes predication operative through the order of the gramma. As Agamben explains, within this 
construction “Language is thus always . . . saying something-on-something; it is therefore always 
pre-sup-positional and objectifying language. Presupposition is the form of linguistic 
signification . . . speaking about a subject” (Agamben 1999b, 33). 
While the thing itself has been apparently suppressed by Aristotle, its replacement emerges 
in his Categories in the form of the protē ousia [2a12-4b19] (Aristotle Vol. 1, 4-8). Agamben 
argues that the protē ousia, a concept that he had prior named as a negative metaphysical 
operator in Language and Death: The Place of Negativity (1982) (Agamben 1991, 16-8), 
significantly modifies the temporality of language in acquiescence to the demands of writing: 
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Expelling the thing itself from his theory of signification, Aristotle absolves writing 
of its weakness. In the place of the thing itself, in the Categories there appears protē 
ousia, first substance, which Aristotle defines as that which is said neither about a 
subject (kat’ hypokeimenou, by means of presupposition) nor in a subject. What does 
this definition mean? First substance is not said on the basis of a presupposition; it 
does not have presuppositions, because it is itself the absolute presupposition on 
which all discourse and knowledge are founded. It alone—as name—can be said 
kat’auto, by itself; it alone—not being in a subject—clearly shows itself. But in 
itself, as individuum, it is ineffable . . . and cannot enter into the linguistic 
signification that it founds, except by abandoning its status as deixis and becoming 
universal predication. The “what,” ti, that was at issue in the name is subsumed into 
discourse as a kata tinos, “that about which” something is said. They—both the what 
and the about which—are therefore the same thing, which can be grasped as to ti en 
einai, the Being-the-what-that-was. In this logico-temporal process, the Platonic 
thing itself is removed and conserved or, rather, conserved only in being removed: e-
liminated (Agamben 1999b, 37). 
According to Agamben, Plato’s unsayable sayabilty—the “weakness of language” that can never 
be inscribed—is transmuted into writing in Aristotle’s thought. In the process, it is spectralized 
as the ultimate ineffable presupposition of predication itself through its transposition into a 
temporal structure. In this conflation or flattening of deixis into predication, sayability is 
separated from the linguistic act and relegated to the threshold of language where it is held in 
what, though predating the terminology of Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1995) 
by a decade, can be described as an inclusive exclusion. What was a contemporaneity in Plato is 
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now circumscribed by a negative temporality induced by writing. Sayability becomes 
predication, captured in representation and obstructed by time, never arriving to speech, as the 
presence of the thing itself is forever consigned to the past tense in writing, from the what to the 
about which. 
This passage is rich with affinities to the philosopher’s other work on language, but as it 
pertains to this critical inquiry, one can discern in this opposition between the protē ousia and the 
thing itself the argument that he adopts in the “Paradox of Passion” essay. While the “perfectly 
self-referential” image, the “Original,” of the eternal return of the like seems to share the 
autonomy that comes with an absence of subject or object with the protē ousia as “the absolute 
presupposition on which all discourse and knowledge are founded,” with the eternal return 
Agamben attempts to overcome the protē ousia’s temporal confinement in the past of predication 
by confounding the presence/absence binary. 
Indeed, the latent tension here, which implicates will no less than time, extends well 
beyond “The Thing Itself,” treading the same conceptual terrain as the eternal return. This 
tendency is evident in Man Without Content as well as the “Paradox of Passion” essay; but, it is 
in “Notes on Gesture” that Agamben explicitly attempts to fuse together the decisive affirmation 
of Nietzsche’s eternal return with the adventitiousness of the Platonic Idea in such a way that the 
temporal considerations that he attributes to each stand in contradiction. The eternal return is an 
inversion of the nihilism presiding over a distended temporality that simply reappropriates 
power, while the Platonic Idea is the rupture of this distended temporality as the gesture “flashes 
up in the epiphany of involuntary memory.” In the first instance, there is an expression of will, in 
the second precisely not. In both cases, the liberating force of transmissibility is situated in a 
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liminal position, but it is alternatively an absence of meaning to be loved and a presence of 
meaning to be recognized. 
Throughout these references to Nietzsche, impressions of Benjamin emerge periodically in 
Agamben’s argumentation. His discussions of gesture are at times reminiscent of Benjamin’s 
discussion of the Platonic Idea in the “Epistemo-critical Prologue” of his The Origin of German 
Tragic Drama (1928) (Benjamin 1998, 31-8), and in the “Paradox of Passion” essay Agamben 
even refers in passing to the eternal return as a “dialectical image” (Agamben 1988, 10).viii 
Benjamin’s own engagement with the eternal return, as it appears in various fragments in his 
incomplete Arcades Project (1982) and notes toward the related unfinished work Charles 
Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism,ix is complex and unresolved. While this 
may play some part in Agamben’s own shifting disposition toward Nietzsche’s idea, among 
Benjamin’s discontinuous articulations there is a consistency in his identification of a conceptual 
triad between Nietzsche, Baudelaire and the nineteenth-century revolutionary socialist Auguste 
Blanqui. In a letter to Max Horkheimer dating from the spring of 1938, he speaks of the “idée 
fixe of the new and the immutable” that unites the three thinkers (Benjamin 1994, 557), a thought 
that is iterated in numerous other passages. 
It is Blanqui’s final work Eternity by the Stars (1872), written while he was imprisoned, 
that Benjamin cites most frequently for its affinity to the eternal return. In this work, published 
ten years prior to The Gay Science, Blanqui proposes a cosmological theory in which the 
universe is comprised of only one hundred elemental bodies that are repeated infinitely, 
implicating both astral systems and earthly life. A letter to Horkheimer of the same year provides 
an early formulation of the relevance of Blanqui to Benjamin’s project on nineteenth-century 
modernity:  
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While deriving his data from mechanistic natural science, the worldview that Blanqui 
outlines is in fact an infernal view, and is, at the same time, in the form of a natural 
view, the complement to a social order that Blanqui had to recognize as victorious 
over him in the last years of his life. . . . It represents unconditional submission, but 
at the same time the most terrible accusation against a society that has reflected this 
image of the cosmos as a projection of itself on to the heavens (Benjamin 1994, 549). 
Interestingly, it is precisely this assessment of Blanqui’s thought that Agamben cites in the 
1982 essay “Benjamin and the Demonic” in regard to the eternal return, which he also likens to 
the punishment given to schoolchildren of writing lines, the Strafe des Nachsitzens (Agamben 
1999b, 155). Indeed, writing is among the images that Blanqui conjures and Benjamin in turn 
transposes in his incomplete drafts of the book on Baudelaire and The Arcades Project: “What I 
write at this moment in a cell at the Fort du Taureau I have written and shall write throughout all 
eternity—at a table, with a pen, clothed as I am now, in circumstances like these. And thus it is 
for everyone” (Blanqui, 146; cited in Benjamin 2002, 114). Benjamin himself alludes to the 
Strafe des Nachsitzens in The Arcades Project in regard to Blanqui’s theory as one of a mythical 
repetition that implicated a humanity who in each century is kept in after school (118).  
The ambivalence on the eternal return that Agamben espouses in his 1982 essay can thus 
without much difficulty be reconstructed in its source material, in spite of—or perhaps due to—
the profusion of references across copious drafts produced over the span of more than a decade 
in which Benjamin reworked these ideas in numerous variations. On the one hand Blanqui’s 
theory is exemplary of his century’s ideological espousal of myth; but, on the other hand, it is 
this ideological locus of the transposition of the immutable onto the new that must be the site of 
its own redemption. As Benjamin muses, “Blanqui, who, on the threshold of the grave, 
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recognizes the Fort du Taureau as his last place of captivity, writes this book in order to open 
new doors in his dungeon” (111).x 
Notwithstanding, while in Benjamin’s thought the proximity of the exercise of writing to 
Nietzsche is not so fixedly determined, it is precisely the image of the writing desk that 
Agamben evokes to stake a claim for a thought beyond Nietzsche, severing the Benjaminian 
nexus between the eternal return and Blanqui’s astral eternity in the process. This move takes 
place in his essay “Bartleby, or On Contingency” of 1993, originally published in a volume with 
Deleuze’s “Bartleby, or the Formula” of the same year, in which he makes a case for the 
contingent, a concept that will resonate in his later philosophy. In this text, Agamben argues that 
whereas in the thought of Blanqui one may still discern a faint lament for “what was not or could 
have been otherwise,” Nietzsche’s eternal return consigns potential being to the past. He also 
returns to Benjamin’s reading of Nietzsche here and, despite the former’s own conceptualization 
of Blanqui in relation to the Strafe des Nachsitzens, Agamben instead deploys this metaphor to 
differentiate the two thinkers, ascribing Nietzsche’s eternal return to the punishment of the child 
writing lines, condemned to copying out the texts of humanity innumerable times, wholly absent 
of any revolutionary value in its mythic repetition (Agamben 1999b, 268). The eternal return is 
thus guilty of suppressing the contingent, which is to become the constitution of the subject in 
Remnants of Auschwitz. 
Furthermore, in “Bartleby” Agamben embraces the wax tablet that he formerly passed over 
in the “Paradox of Passion” essay, now favoring the extreme passivity that he there imputes to 
Bataille, Derrida, Levinas and Nancy. Whereas once it was Nietzsche’s elimination of time 
between writing and erasing that surpassed the paradox of passion of Aristotle’s writing tablet in 
its fusion of the will to power and pure receptivity that captivated Agamben (Agamben 1988, 14-
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7), here the personage of Bartleby, Melville’s reluctant scrivener that becomes himself a writing 
tablet—“his own white sheet”—is the figure of salvation (Agamben 1999b, 253-5). With his 
preference “not to” that introduces contingency into the scheme of potentiality, which Agamben 
notes has frequently reduced to merely will and necessity, Bartleby becomes the very 
personification of contingency. He writes, 
To be capable, in pure potentiality, to bear the “no more than” beyond Being and 
Nothing, fully experiencing the impotent possibility that exceeds both—this is the 
trial that Bartleby announces. The green screen that isolates his desk traces the 
borders of an experimental laboratory in which potentiality, three decades before 
Nietzsche and in a sense altogether different from his, frees itself of the principle of 
reason. Emancipating itself from Being and non-Being alike, potentiality thus creates 
its own ontology (259). 
The Benjaminian writing desk of Blanqui, at which he forges new doors to his dungeon, 
becomes both the site of Nietzsche’s eternal punishment of writing lines and the messianic 
potentiality of Bartleby’s cessation of writing. 
Potentiality, in the Agambenian sense, is thus opposed to the eternal return with reference 
to writing. While in the endless copying of the eternal return, “the infinite repetition of what was 
abandons all its potential not to be,” the interruption of writing when the scrivener stops copying 
provokes a messianic moment of “decreation” in which “God summons all his potential not to 
be, creating on the basis of a point of indifference between potentiality and impotentiality” (268, 
270). Agamben continues, “The creation that is now fulfilled is neither a re-creation nor an 
eternal repetition; it is, rather, a decreation in which what happened and what did not happen are 
returned to their originary unity in the mind of God, while what could have not been but was 
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becomes indistinguishable from what would have been but was not” (270). Here, the eternal 
return, rather than being itself a messianic force as encountered in the gesture essays, instead 
appears as an obstacle to messianic force whose unrelenting repetition must cease. 
In addition to this aversion toward writing that is shared with “The Thing Itself,” 
Agamben’s critique of the eternal return here largely hinges upon questions of will and decision. 
Bartleby’s signature “I’d prefer not to” opens a “zone of indistinction” between yes and no and 
thus confounds the common misguided attribution of decision to potentiality and its relation to 
actuality. He explains, “Potentiality is not will, and impotentiality is not necessity; . . . To believe 
that will has power over potentiality, that the passage to actuality is the result of a decision that 
puts an end to the ambiguity of potentiality (which is always potentiality to do and not to do)—
this is the perpetual illusion of morality” (254-5). This illusion mirrors that of the sovereign 
decision that is always in the position of an undecidable, yet it is opposed to the pure force of the 
self-reflexive, self-perpetuating will in Language and Death (Agamben 1998, 27; 1991, 86-7). 
Further bolstering the critique of instrumentality that may readily be discerned in 
Bartleby’s impotence, reason joins will and decision in its undoing by the scrivener’s quiet 
espousal of preference and potentiality, both of which “no longer function to assure the 
supremacy of Being over Nothing,” but rather exist in the indifference between the two. 
Interestingly, Agamben argues that this indifference does not constitute an equivalence between 
these two opposite principles (Agamben 1999b, 259). Potentiality instead “creates its own 
ontology” in a liminal state of senselessness and indecision. Unlike the eternal return which is 
nothing more than a “will to will” of “an eternally repeated action,” a fallacy that is captive of 
the nihilism it purports to embrace, Bartleby’s cessation of copying—of will, reason and 
decision—ultimately bears upon the relation of humanity to the law, instituting “a liberation 
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from the ‘oldness of the letter’” (268, 270). Notwithstanding his bleak end, Bartleby, assumes the 
figure of the Messiah.xi 
Where Agamben makes a final break from his various earlier exegeses and definitively 
condemns the eternal return is in Remnants of Auschwitz. Here, his critique of Nietzsche’s 
proposition, previously aligned with pure means, is intimately bound up with temporality and the 
metaphysics of presence. In this seminal text, the eternal return not only marks the failure of the 
twentieth-century ethical project to overcome resentment, it also represents the disaster of the 
attempt to conceptualise an authentic originary temporality. 
Comparing Primo Levi’s The Drowned and the Saved (1986) to Jean Améry’s At the 
Mind’s Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its Realities (1964), Agamben 
attributes to each a particular invalidation of the eternal return: 
The ethics of the twentieth century opens with Nietzsche’s overcoming of 
resentment. Against the impotence of the will with respect to the past, against the 
spirit of revenge for what has irrevocably taken place and can no longer be willed, 
Zarathustra teaches men to will backward, to desire that everything repeat itself. The 
critique of Judeo-Christian morality is completed in our century in the name of a 
capacity fully to assume the past, liberating oneself once and for all of guilt and bad 
conscience. The eternal return is above all a victory over resentment, the possibility 
of willing what has taken place, transforming every “it was” into a “thus I wanted it 
to be” –amor fati (Agamben 1999c, 99). 
In light of Auschwitz, which one could never wish to relive, the response to the demon’s 
provocation to renounce resentment, “Do you desire this once more and innumerable times 
more?” is not only an absolute refusal of the amor fati, and a cleaving to resentment to hold the 
© Jenny Doussan 2015 
 
20 
truth of the atrocity before the criminal as advocated by Améry. The eternal return is, in the end, 
redundant in the face of the “ferocious and implacable experience” of Levi’s recurring nightmare 
of Auschwitz: “One cannot want Auschwitz to return for eternity, since in truth it has never 
ceased to take place; it is always already repeating itself” (100-1). While the eternal return 
exemplifies the failure of ethics in its futile attempt to surpass morality, it also shares with the 
horror of Auschwitz “a new, unprecedented ontological consistency” in the way of its distinctive 
temporal status. 
 The experience of Auschwitz eternally returns not only in dreams, but also as prophetic 
certainty. Past and future collapse as their temporal boundaries dissolve. Speaking of the altered 
character of the ethical problem after Auschwitz, Agamben asserts, 
It is no longer a question of conquering the spirit of revenge in order to assume the 
past, willing its return for eternity; nor is it a matter of a holding fast to the 
unacceptable through resentment. What lies before us now is a being beyond 
acceptance and refusal, beyond the eternal past and the eternal present—an event that 
returns eternally but that, precisely for this reason, is absolutely, eternally 
unassumable. Beyond good and evil lies not the innocence of becoming but, rather, a 
shame that is not only without guilt but even without time (102-3). 
In terms identical to those of the “Paradox of Passion” essay, Agamben articulates the unique 
capacity of the camp to obliterate human subjectivity through its distension of time. The absence 
of time between writing and its erasure imagined there, here undertakes not only the surpassing 
of metaphysics but the eradication of the human being as well. Shame, which Agamben 
establishes as the temporal constitution of the human subject (109-12), is here stripped of its 
time. In this timeless space of the camp, his earlier conclusion to the “Paradox of Passion” essay 
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resonates in a darker tone: “Pure passion, as the final coincidence of potentia passiva and 
potentia activa, is in itself immemorable. The like, the image perpetually returning, cannot be 
retained in the memory. Its eternal return is passion, in which, between the writing and its 
erasing, there is, as Nietzsche says, keine Zeit, no time” (Agamben 1988, 17). Agamben’s 
etymology of the like of the eternal return as cadaver (9) becomes the camp’s fabrication of 
corpses (Agamben 1999c, 70-2). 
In Remnants of Auschwitz, the condition of the camp as a spatio-temporal entity now 
implicates the eternal return and invalidates any conception of an originary temporality in which 
“the ‘I’ comes to itself in authentically assuming its own irreparable past” (127). The truly 
metaphysical activity of the Man Without Content to “[tune] his being to the universal becoming 
in the circle of the eternal recurrence” (Agamben 1999a, 91) is far removed from Remnants of 
Auschwitz, and the futility attributed to its “will to will” in “Bartleby” (Agamben 1999b, 268) 
assumes the status of the worst. He writes, “The camp, the absolute situation, is the end of every 
possibility of an originary temporality, that is, of the temporal foundation of a singular position 
in space, of a Da. In the camp, the irreparability of the past takes the form of an absolute 
immanence; . . . anticipation and succession are parodically flattened on each other” (Agamben 
1999c, 128). This flattening equates the displacement of contingency with the forced existence of 
the impossible, the catastrophe of the subject that “defines a biopolitical experiment on the 
operators of Being, an experiment that transforms and disarticulates the subject to a limit point in 
which the link between subjectification and desubjectification seems to break apart” (148). 
Agamben’s response to this temporal crisis in which past and future, life and law, possible 
and impossible, coincide in an interminable non-moment is not the inversion encountered in the 
Means Without End essays—this would simply rehearse the will to will—nor is it the 
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expropriation from language all reference through a Bartleby-like decreation instituting of zone 
of indistinction between potentiality and impotentiality (Agamben 1999b, 255, 270) which 
would, rather than instantiating contingency, see it eradicated. Agamben’s thought here instead 
indicates an alternative consideration given to time. He states, 
We must cease to look toward processes of subjectification and desubjectification, of 
the living being’s becoming speaking and of the speaking being’s becoming living 
and, more generally, toward historical processes as if they had an apocalyptic or 
profane telos in which the living being and the speaking being, the inhuman and the 
human—or any terms of a historical process—are joined in an established, completed 
humanity and reconciled in a realized identity. This does not mean that, in lacking an 
end, they are condemned to meaningless, disenchanted drifting. They have not an 
end, but a remnant. There is no foundation in or beneath them; rather, at their center 
lies an irreducible disjunction in which each term, stepping forth in the place of a 
remnant, can bear witness (Agamben 1999c, 159). 
In this passage, the liminality that in his earlier work was so characterized by indeterminacy is 
now reconceived as an irreducible disjunction that stands in contrast to a “meaningless, 
disenchanted drifting,” a phrase evocative of Agamben’s persistent criticisms of Derrida. 
Indeed, though in Remnants of Auschwitz, Agamben does not refer directly to writing in 
relation to the eternal return or in the familiar idiom of the Strafe des Nachsitzens, the inscriptive 
is nonetheless implicated as it appears within the figure of deconstruction. Like his determination 
of the eternal return, deconstruction here exhibits the temporality of the camp. While Agamben 
conceives the enunciative construct of testimony as taking place in the irreducible disjunction of 
bearing witness, “the subject’s only dwelling place,” it is in this very “non-place” that 
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deconstruction instead “inscribes its ‘trace’ and its différance, in which voice and letter, meaning 
and presence are infinitely differed.” He continues, “The intimacy that betrays our non-
coincidence with ourselves is the place of testimony. Testimony takes place in the non-place of 
articulation. In the non-place of the Voice stands not writing, but the witness” (129-30). 
Deconstruction’s infinite deferral of signification in writing is thus summarily dismissed in 
favour of the mechanistic alterity of testimony.xii Rather than the interminable coincidence of 
sense and denotation of deconstruction (Agamben 1998, 25) or that of past and future of the 
eternal return with which it shares a disposition toward writing, in testimony the currents of 
subjectification and desubjectification are described as “coextensive, but not coincident.” With 
this swapping of terms, Agamben reinserts spatial and temporal boundaries into the camp’s 
spatio-temporal conflation of the threshold of subjectivity. He writes, 
The human being is thus always beyond and before the human, the central threshold 
through which pass currents of the human and the inhuman, subjectification and 
desubjectification, the living being’s becoming speaking and the logos’ becoming 
living. These currents are coextensive, but not coincident; their non-coincidence, the 
subtle ridge that divides them, is the place of testimony (Agamben 1999c, 135). 
The eternal return, as the final coincidence of active and passive principles is timeless, while the 
noncoincidence of the active and passive principles of the subject produced in the temporality of 
auto-affection has time as its only preserve against obliteration. Testimony is the subject’s sole 
respite from the absolute immanence of the camp that eternally returns. 
In a late fragment titled “New Theses C” Walter Benjamin writes, “The fundamental 
concept of myth is the world as punishment—punishment which actually engenders those to 
whom the punishment is due. Eternal recurrence is the punishment of being kept in after school, 
© Jenny Doussan 2015 
 
24 
projected onto the cosmic sphere: humanity has to copy out its text in endless repetitions (Eluard, 
Répétitions)” (Benjamin 2006, 403; translation modified). In light of Benjamin’s earlier 
reference to Répétitions and Max Ernst’s frontispiece of the four boys distracted by a horizon 
beyond their detention, the place of eternal recurrence in his schema of redemption remains 
ambiguous. This is not so for Agamben, in whose thought the eternal return traverses a spectrum 
from the redemptive to the annihilative. Furthermore, it is clear that not only has the 
philosopher’s reading of Nietzsche changed, but so have those of Benjamin and Heidegger, both 
of whom have had a profound influence on his thought. 
What emerges through Agamben’s extensive engagement with Nietzsche’s proposition is 
an instrumental conception of the inscriptive that shares its temporal catastrophe. This 
constellation bears ongoing relevance in Agamben’s thought. Consider his citation in The 
Signature of All Things: On Method (2008) of the Roman Curia’s suppression of the monks’ 
form of life with its codification of the regula in writing (Agamben 2009, 21-2), a question 
elaborated in The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life (2011) in which law and 
writing become synonymous (Agamben 2013, 86-8). This line of enquiry is particularly salient 
in light of the imminent conclusion of the Homo Sacer series in which Agamben completes his 
ontology of politics.
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Notes 
                                                
i In his exhaustively researched critical introduction, Leland de la Durantaye both accuses 
Agamben of misrepresenting Nietzsche’s idea of the eternal return in Remnants of Auschwitz on 
the subject of overcoming resentment (“Here it is as if Agamben were responding to a vulgarized 
ii So pronounced is Heidegger’s influence upon his reading of Nietzsche in this text that 
Agamben explicitly acknowledges his debt to the philosopher in a footnote, citing the 
impossibility of the chapter’s presentation of Marx without his teacher’s studies of Nietzsche. 
(Agamben 1999a, 127 n.32). Indeed, the correspondences of Agamben’s reading here with 
Heidegger’s are too abundant to enumerate. 
iii Crucially, Heidegger’s formula is founded on the term Schein rather than Gleichen (Heidegger 
214). While Agamben does note Nietzsche’s assertion of the will to power as a will to Schein, he 
does not give mention to Heidegger and furthermore treats the two formulae as synonymous: 
“[Nietzsche] is therefore able to write that ‘the will to likeness is the will to power’ as elsewhere 
he had stated that the will to power is the will to Schein, to appearance and becoming” (Agamben 
1988, 13). 
iv See Klossowski’s discussion of the symbiotic relation between active and passive in the eternal 
return in Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle (Klossowski 1997, 98-9). Interestingly, there is also a 
discernable affinity here in Agamben’s characterization of the image that “precedes both what it 
is an image of and what it is impressed upon” and Maurice Blanchot’s commentary on 
Klossowski’s thought of the image that “must cease to be second in relation to an alleged first 
object and must lay claim to a certain primacy, just as the original and finally the origin will lose 
their privileges as initial powers.” This passage is quoted by Deleuze in a footnote of Difference 
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and Repetition. See Blanchot’s “Laughter of the Gods,” in Friendship (Blanchot 177-80); and 
Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (Deleuze 2011, 162 n.28). See also Klossowski’s 
“Nietzsche, Polytheism, and Parody” in Such a Deathly Desire (Klossowski 2007, 112-3). 
v To some extent this conception is suggestive of Agamben’s later critique of Gershom 
Scholem’s being in force without significance (Agamben 1998, 50-1). 
vi This sentiment, though to some extent connoting Hegel, recalls Agamben’s later commentary 
on Kafka’s “enigmatic” statement that the Messiah will only come after his arrival, and of the 
beatitude of a potentiality “that comes only after the act” (Agamben 1998, 57; 2005a, 56).  
vii Agamben explicitly likens Nietzsche’s eternal return to Deleuze’s difference and repetition in 
the essay “Difference and Repetition: On Guy Debord’s Films,” which restates many of the ideas 
present in the essays on gesture. See Giorgio Agamben, “Difference and Repetition: On Guy 
Debord’s Films” (Agamben 2004, 315-6). 
viii The quote rather cryptically reads: “The idea of the eternal return is primarily an idea of the 
like, something in the order of a total image, or, to use Benjamin’s words, a dialectical image. 
And only in this context, perhaps, does the eternal return take on its essential significance.” This 
brief comment is the only mention of Benjamin in the essay. 
ix Unpublished in Benjamin’s lifetime, Agamben has recently compiled a new Italian edition of 
this work. 
x An interesting counterpoint to Benjamin’s understanding of the redemptive aspect of the eternal 
return presented here is Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche’s will to power as the self-dissolution of 
mechanical order by thought (Deleuze 2006, 44-5). 
xi Bartleby and the eternal return are again put into play against each other in the first of 
Agamben’s multi-volume Homo Sacer series, which, at the time of writing, nears completion. At 
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the conclusion of the chapter on “Potentiality and Law,” Agamben acknowledges Nietzsche’s 
amor fati as “an attempt to conceive of being beyond the principle of sovereignty” that renders 
potentiality and actuality indistinguishable even as it subsumes contingency into necessity. The 
figure of Bartleby, however, comes closest to achieving this end if still falling short of freeing 
itself from the sovereign ban, the task that Agamben claims as his own (Agamben 1998, 48). Of 
perhaps greater significance to the argument presented in this paper is Agamben’s thesis of a 
Benjaminian resolution of life into writing that is advanced in his exegesis of a series of letters 
exchanged between Benjamin and Gershom Sholem in 1934. Agamben argues that Benjamin’s 
comments on the tendency of Kafka’s allegories toward transforming life into scripture evoke 
the total resolution of life into law such that the sovereign ban, which determines the relation 
between the two terms, dissolves in a “real state of exception” (54-5). Without here endeavoring 
to advance a counter-reading on the subject, for the sake of argument, one may provisionally 
suggest that such a hypothetical Benjaminian resolution of life into writing would not amount to 
a recuperation of the inscriptive from the Strafe des Nachsitzens. But, rather, in its obliteration of 
the law’s being-in-force-without-significance, it transforms the transcendent inscriptive form of 
language into an immanent enunciative one. Agamben himself makes a similar argument in his 
essay of 1983, “Language and History: Linguistic and Historical Categories in Benjamin’s 
Thought” (Agamben 1999b, 48-61). See also Daniel Heller-Roazen’s introduction to 
Potentialities in which he critiques Agamben’s thought in relation to Benjamin’s description of 
historical method as “to read what was never written,” a citation of Hofmannsthal found in 
“Theses on the Philosophy of History” (1-23). 
xii While Durantaye elaborates Agamben’s criticism of the mechanical quality of deconstruction 
(Durantaye, 189), the textual evidence suggests that Agamben’s own work at times exhibits this 
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very quality. In particular, Agamben delineates a dualistic structure of linguistic experience in 
which the two sides, oath and grace, exist in dialectical equilibrium of noncoincidence in Time 
That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans (Agamben 2005c, 134-6), and even in 
State of Exception, as he denounces the juridico-politcal system as a “killing machine,” there is 
nonetheless some suggestion of its prior mechanical functionality, even if we can no longer 
maintain it as operable (Agamben 2005b, 85-7). These are but two examples of this mechanical 
quality rearing its head in Agamben’s counter-mechanical formulas. I have written in detail 
elsewhere on this matter; see “Time and Presence in Agamben’s Critique of Deconstruction” 
(Doussan 2013). 
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